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BRICE MCADOO CLAGETT*
All administrative decision-making involving the formulation of
policy is divided into three parts: informal action, rule making, and
formal adjudication. This is an oversimplification, but a useful one.
Implementation of policy, while intimately involved with-and
sometimes physically and chronologically inseparable from-its
formulation, is nonetheless an analytically distinct operation. The
distinction is clearest in the case of rule making, which normally
consists of the formulation of a policy (rule) in a fashion procedurally
separate from any implementation or application of that policy to
particular cases.' An adjudication 2 may involve merely the application
to a particular case of a policy previously formulated by some other
means, but it more frequently involves a choice between various
policies and the simultaneous application of the chosen policy to the
facts of the particular case; nonetheless the two processes are
analytically distinguishable. Informal actions are similar in this
f This article grows out of the work of the Rulemaking Committee of the Administrative
Conference of the United States in 1969-70; the writer served as ad hoc secretary to the
committee during that period. The insights of its chairman, Mr. Howard C. Westwood, and of
the other members of the committee have been crucial in the development of the views presented
herein. However, those views are those of the author and have not been considered or approved
by the Administrative Conference or, except to the extent specifically indicated herein, by the
Rulemaking Committee.
* Member of the District of Columbia Bar. B.A. 1954, Princeton University; LL.B. 1958,
Harvard University.
1. Exceptions exist because section 2 of the Administrative Procedure Act [APA] defines
"rule" as "an agency statement of general orparticular applicability and future effect .... 5
U.S.C. § 551(4) (Supp. V, 1970) (emphasis added). For the meaning of this cryptic language,
see I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.02 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
DAVqs-TREATiSE]. "Rule making" is defined as "agency process for formulating, amending,
or repealing a rule . . .. " 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (Supp. V, 1970).
2. Throughout this article the term "adjudication" will be used to refer only to formal
adjudication-that is, adjudication "required by statute to be determined on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing ... " 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (Supp. V, 1970). Where the term
"formal adjudication" is used, the word "formal" is added merely for emphasis. The APA
defines "adjudication" much more broadly, as "agency process for the formulation of an
order." Id. § 551(7). "Order" is in turn defined as "a final disposition, whether affirmative,
negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule making but
including licensing.... Id. § 551(6). The great bulk of "adjudications" in this broad sense
are informal actions as that term is used herein. See note 3 infra.
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respect to adjudication; but when an agency acts informally, the fact
that policy is being formulated may be obscured by failure to
articulate the policy or by articulation only in a fashion not available
to the public.
The above discussion is not intended as a purportedly self-
contained generalization that would ignore the many subtleties of the
processes in question, the differences within each of the three
categories, or the fact that elements of two or all three may be
involved in a particular case. It is intended merely to suggest, as a
framework for discussion, that policy making by administrative
officers can roughly and generally be classified, according to the
procedure followed, in one of these three categories. The distinction
between rule making and adjudication is, of course, at least verbally
formalized and enshrined in the provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act [APA1. Informal actions 3 are, almost by definition,
those formulations of policy which, for one reason or another, fall
outside the supposed rigors of the APA as it now stands.' Informal
action may also be involved, in substance, when an agency decides
formal proceedings without articulating in a meaningful way the
policies which lie behind its decision.
3. Generally, the term "informal action" is used herein to mean those formulations of
agency policy which are subject neither to the notice and public-participation requirements of
sections 553(b) and (c), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (Supp. V, 1970), nor to the requirements of a
formal adjudication. Of course the very nature of policy formulation excludes those agency acts
which are merely ministerial or are otherwise so plainly dictated by statute that no choice among
competing possible policies is involved.
4. The Act is riddled with exceptions, some of which may merit reconsideration. Section 4,
id. § 553(a)(1), exempts from all procedural requirements in the Act any rule making involving
"a military or foreign affairs function of the United States." Similarly exempted are matters
"relating to agency management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or
contracts." Id. § 553(a)(2). Recommendation No. 16 of the Administrative Conference
advocated repeal of the section 553(a)(2) exemption for matters involving public property, loans,
grants, benefits, or contracts. 1969 ANNUAL REPORT, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 45-46 (1970); see Bonfield, Public Property, Loans, Grants, Benefits, or
Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 554 (1970). Except for the right of interested persons to petition
for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (Supp. V, 1970), the rule-
making procedural requirements do not apply to "interpretative rules, general statements of
policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice." Id. § 553(b)(A). An agency can
similarly avoid conducting a rule-making proceeding if it "finds (and incorporates the finding
and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure are
impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." Id. § 553(b)(B). As to
adjudications, the statute contains procedural requirements only for formal adjudications, see
note 2 supra, and imposes no requirements on the host of agency actions which are technically
adjudications but fall outside the definition of a formal adjudication. Even within the class of
formal adjudications, sections 554(a)(l)-(6) carve out a number of exceptions. Id. § 554(a)(l)-
(6).
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Much of the literature on administrative law and procedure is
devoted to attempts to formulate ideal boundaries between these three
procedural notions and to define the specific procedural devices and
opportunities most appropriate to each of them.
The present article has two basic theses. First, there is general and
sound agreement, at least among those outside Government and also
by many inside -it, that the realm of informal action should be
considerably restricted, to the profit of its two rivals, from the area
which it presently occupies; and informal action itself-in the area
which it continues to occupy-should often be accompanied by a
greater degree of articulation of standards and of reasons for
decisions. Second, the contest between rule making and adjudication
is largely an unprofitable one and, in at least many instances where
the choice between them is debatable, the course of greatest wisdom is
to employ elements of both in fashioning a procedure most
appropriate to the particular issues and circumstances of each case or
class of cases. As will be suggested, both of these propositions are
greatly illuminated and strengthened by judicial decisions,
publications, and other events of the last two years.
I.
The salient characteristic of informal action is that it involves
formulation of policy which has an impact on the citizenry, or
portions of it, although the formulation may be hidden from the
public view. Even the very existence of a policy is often invisible
because the act of formulation is never acknowledged, and the act of
implementation may be carried out, intentionally or otherwise, in a
manner which disguises the fact that a policy is being applied, let
alone what that policy is. Articulation of the policy may exist in a
departmental or agency file, or it may exist only in the minds of the
officials implementing it. Even worse, there may be no policy at all in
situations where good and fair administration requires that there be
one.
One may hasten to admit that formulation of policy by informal
means is, for one reason or another, unavoidable and even desirable in
some areas. Sensitive questions of foreign and defense policy are
perhaps the most obvious examples. It is undisputed, however, that
informal action is not a desirable means for the formulation of policy
in many other areas. Informal action involves policy decisions
without any prior notice to-let alone participation by-the general
Vol. 1971:51]
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public or those members thereof who will be affected by the policy. It
may involve no judicial review, except to the extent that a court may
be persuaded to declare that under the circumstances a wholly
different procedure was required by law.5 Perhaps most important of
all, if the policy in question has never been articulated or at least never
publicly announced, the public cannot know the nature of the policy,
its intended scope and limitations, or the reasons for it. The public can
therefore judge neither whether the policy is sound nor, if it is sound,
whether it is being applied fairly and consistently to those cases which
by its own definition fall within it. Nor can a member of the public
assess whether the policy has an impact on him or, if it does, the
nature and scope of that impact. Informal action presents, in short,
substantial dangers of arbitrariness, inconsistency, unfairness, and
possible corruption.
Once one concedes that informal action is necessary in some areas
despite these potentialities for abuse, the question becomes whether it
is being employed, at the expense of more appropriate procedures, in
areas where it is not necessary. Today there is a consensus among
those best qualified to form a meaningful opinion that this question
must be answered in the affirmative. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis'
brilliant book on this subject 6 seems to the present writer to
demonstrate conclusively that many agencies are not resorting as fully
as would be both possible and desirable to the use of available
procedures. Instead, these agencies to a large degree are still acting on
the basis of policies and standards that have either never been
articulated or, if articulated within the agency, have never been
subjected to the salutary crucible of procedures involving some degree
of public knowledge and participation. Clearly, the vast bulk of
administrative policy decisions are in fact made by informal action,
5. But see pp. 57-59 infra. The District of Columbia Circuit has recently held that an agency
interpretative rule -even an "informal" rule stated in a letter in response to an inquiry - while
not requiring a rule-making proceeding, is judicially reviewable so long as the subject matter of
the rule is actual rather than hypothetical and so long as the ruling is final within the agency.
National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Schultz, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1971).
6. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUsTICE-A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969) [hereinafter cited
as DAVIS-INQUIRY]. See also DAVIS-TREATISE §§ 1.04-8, 1.04-13, 4.13-.22 (1970 Supp.);
Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 713 (1969). Closely related points
were made with equal cogency and a wealth of detail in Judge Friendly's Holmes Lectures,
although Friendly addressed himself primarily to the inadequacy of articulated standards in the
disposition of formal proceedings, not to what goes on when there are no formal proceedings at
all. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of
Standards, 75 HARV. L. REV. 863, 1055, 1263 (1962).
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with the more formal procedures occupying only a small part of the
whole. Until recently attention may have focused unduly on
refinements of the formal procedures where they are already and
admittedly applicable, with relatively little attention given to the
much broader problem of how to bring some degree of procedural
regularity and articulation to bear on the areas commonly assumed to
be outside the area of formal administrative procedure altogether.
Professor Davis raises the problem in some areas that have rarely
been regarded as even potential candidates for formal procedure, such
as the unfettered discretion generally possessed and exercised by
prosecutors in deciding which apparent crimes to prosecute and which
to drop.7 But he also discusses many areas which could and should be
subjected to formal procedures with little or no alteration in
conventional assumptions and habits of thought, including many
areas where the failure of administrators to avail themselves of such
procedures is quite inexcusable.
Many reasons, not all of them sinister, explain why administrators
will probably always draw the line between informal action and more
formal methods of policy-making in a manner considerably more
generous to the former than most non-administrators would regard as
7. DAVIS-INQUIRY 162-214. This fascinating area unfortunately cannot be treated in any
detail here. One horrible example not mentioned by Davis was brought to light in Seagle, The
Twilight of the Mann Act, 55 A.B.A.J. 641 (1969), although the author of that article
apparently did not regard it as such. The Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1964), makes it a felony
to transport a woman across state lines for any "immoral purpose"--the sort of vague statutory
language which inevitably leads to administrative arbitrariness unless clarified and made more
specific by implementing regulations-a procedure not generally available, or at least not
thought to be available, in the application of criminal statutes. Seeming to suggest that there is
no urgent need to repeal the Mann Act in spite of its alarming verbal breadth, Mr. Seagle
observed that prosecuting attorneys generally enforce the Act only in what they regard as
"aggravated" situations. One example given of an "aggravated" type of situation is a case
where the woman was "chaste" before beginning her interstate odyssey! Seagle, supra, at 643.
There seems little doubt that, even with respect to less ambiguous statutes, prosecutorial
discretion is so broad and powerful as to present substantial danger of abuse. But the
prescription is less apparent than the diagnosis, although Davis makes some provocative
suggestions. The current revitalization, as regards criminal statutes, of the "void for vagueness"
doctrine may provide a partial solution. See, e.g., Ricks v. United States, 414 F.2d 111 (D.C.
Cir. 1968); Ricks v. District of Columbia, 414 F.2d 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1968); United States v.
Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969), prob. juris. noted, 397 U.S. 1061 (1970); Broughton
v. Brewer, 298 F. Supp. 260 (D. Ala. 1969); Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897 (D. Colo.
1969).
For better or worse, however, it is too late to contend seriously that the "void for vagueness"
doctrine has any significant promise in inhibiting virtually unlimited grants of discretion to
agencies in non-criminal matters. If "unfair methods of competition" is not too vague for a
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desirable or fair. Articulation of policy is difficult and burdensome,
particularly the formulation of standards which give the public some
reasonable guidance as to the limits of the policy by suggesting rules
for deciding, or at least identifying, the hard cases; the "I know it
when I see it" approach is much easier. Administrators may have a
perfectly genuine fear of formulating abstract standards which, as
particular cases arise, may be found not altogether satisfactory,
particularly if the administrators are going to be placed under some
degree of restraint in changing those standards. Moreover, formal
procedures take time and money, both of which are often in short
supply.
As opposed to those considerations which commend more formal
procedures, all of the above factors in support of informal action are
likely to loom larger in the minds of administrators than in the minds
of others, including judges, lawyers in private practice, and writers of
law review articles. There is a need, therefore-and there seems every
reason to believe it will be a continuing need-for means by which the
administrators may be persuaded and, if unpersuaded, compelled to
restrict unfettered discretion by use of more formal procedures in
certain areas and instances where they would not do so if left wholly to
their own devices. Professor Davis and others have, in this writer's
judgment, demonstrated that the presently available means for
accomplishing this persuasion or compulsion are inadequate. What
additional means are needed?
A few courts have begun to fashion a legal doctrine which, if it
flourishes and is applied wherever it seems clearly applicable, should
go far toward improving the situation. Two leading cases are Hornsby
statute prohibiting conduct, even with only civil sanctions, it is hard to think of any language
that could be. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964), constitutionality upheld, Sears Roebuck & Co. v.
FTC, 258 F. 307 (7th Cir. 1919).
A closely related problem, probably more prevalent in local than in federal law, is the
practice of adopting statutes or regulations which "overshoot" by making almost everyone a
lawbreaker, see DAVIS-INQUIRY 165, and then vesting in prosecutors or, as a practical matter,
in individual policemen virtually unlimited discretion to punish such conduct as they deem
offensive. A classic though perhaps petty example is the common practive of promulgating
absurdly low speed limits. The effective speed limit is then set by tacit consent between police
and drivers. This may not be altogether inequitable as a general matter, but woe to the driver
who either is ignorant of the "real" speed limit or who becomes the object of police interest for
other reasons. Disorderly conduct and vagrancy statutes have comparable results and are
intolerably vague to boot. The situation often created-the power of the police and government
lawyers to arrest and prosecute almost anyone for something or other if they want to-is
characteristic neither of a free society nor of one governed by law.
[Vol. 1971:51
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v. Allen8 and Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority.9 In
Hornsby, the court held that a state agency acted without
constitutional due process when it denied an application for a liquor-
store license without articulating, in rules and regulations, any
standards to govern action on such applications and without giving
any explanation of the basis for denial of the particular application in
question. In Holmes, the court reached a similar result in re'iewing
the denial of the plaintiff's application for admission to a low-rent
public housing project by an agency which allegedly'0 had adopted no
standards for choosing among applicants and had given those found
ineligible no reasons for its decisions. Both Hornsby and Holmes
pointed out in strong terms the necessity for articulated standards and
reasons for decision in order to avoid or minimize such abuses as
arbitrariness, favoritism, and corruption. If administrative practices
like those condemned in Hornsby and Holmes rise to fourteenth
amendment due process significance, it must be wholly clear that at
least equal requirements are imposed on federal agencies by the fifth
amendment" if not by the APA. This suggests the intriguing
conclusion that administrative action, even in the many areas
expressly exempted from the rule-making requirements of the APA, is
nevertheless subject on constitutional grounds to some minimum
requirement of articulation and non-arbitrariness where it affects
private rights or interests. And it is well known that traditional
"standing" limitations and other doctrines restricting the types of
rights and interests which may be judicially cognizable in relation to
agency action are very rapidly being eroded in favor of wider
governmental accountability to those affected by governmental
policy.'2
Two holdings of the highest importance in this developing
requirement of articulation of policy were made in Environmental
8. 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
9. 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968). See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Smith v.
Lander, 288 F. Supp. 66 (S.D. Miss. 1968); Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. Cm.
L. REV. 713, 730 (1969).
10. The decision was on a motion to dismiss. 398 F.2d at 264.
11. In Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670 (1967), the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider (as it subsequently explained, Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268,
272 (1969)) whether a tenant in a federally assisted housing project "was denied due process by
the [local] Housing Authority's refusal to state the reasons for her eviction and to afford her a
hearing at which she could contest the sufficiency of those reasons." However, the case was
decided on other grounds.
12. See DAVIS-TREATISE ch. 22 (1970 Supp.).
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Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus.3 First, the court construed the
provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act 4
as requiring, in effect, that the Secretary of Agriculture institute
formal proceedings in a situation where he proposed to give the matter
informal consideration for some time before deciding whether to act
formally. The statute provides that when a registered pesticide fails to
conform to certain standards, the
registration is subject to cancellation in accordance with procedures prescribed
by statute. In the ordinary case, the administrative process begins when the
Secretary issues a notice of cancellation to the registrant. The matter may then
be referred, at the request of the registrant, to a scientific advisory committee,
and to a public hearing, before the Secretary issues the order that effectively
cancels or continues the registration.' 5
Environmental protection groups petitioned the Secretary
requesting him to issue a notice of cancellation with respect to DDT.
While issuing such notices with respect to certain uses of DDT, the
Secretary proposed to conduct informal investigations with respect to
other uses before deciding whether to issue notices against those uses.
Subsequently the Secretary, though making a number of findings
regarding the harmfulness of DDT, took the position that issuance of
the requested notices of cancellation should continue to be deferred on
the ground that investigations were still being conducted and that
final decisions had not been made concerning the uses for which
cancellation notices had not been issued." The court held that the
issuance of notices of cancellation was meant to be the beginning, not
the end, of the administrative process and that once there was "a
substantial question" concerning the safety of a registered pesticide,
the Secretary was required to issue a cancellation notice and thus to
trigger the formal administrative process.17 The Court declared that
[t]he Secretary may, of course, conduct a reasonable preliminary investigation
before taking action under the statute. . . . But when, as in this case, he
reaches the conclusion that there is a substantial question about the safety of a
registered item, he is obliged to initiate the statutory procedure that results in
a public hearing. We recognize, of course, that one important function of
that procedure is to afford the registrant an opportunity to challenge the initial
decision of the Secretary. But the hearing, in particular, serves other functions
13. 27 AD. L.2D 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Bazelon, C.J.).
14. 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135k (1964).
15. 27 AD. L.2D at 1056.
16. Id. at 1055.
17. Id. at 1067.
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as well. Public hearings bring the public into the dedision-making process, and
create a record that facilitates judicial review. I f.hearings are held only after the
Secretary is convinced beyond a doubt that cancellation is necessary, then they
will be held too seldom and too late in the process to serve either of those
functions effectively.
8
The court therefore remanded the case to the Secretary "with
instructions to issue notices with respect to the remaining uses of
DDT, and thereby commence the administrative process."' 9 While the
court rested its decision on the statutory scheme in question and on its
legislative history, it found little in those authorities more specific
than t he principle that "when Congress creates a procedure that gives
the public a role in deciding important questions of public policy, that
procedure may not lightly be sidestepped by administrators." 20 Thus
there is excellent reason to regard the precedent set by the court as
having a potentially broad application beyond the area directly
involved. For example, the rule-making provisions of the APA are
themselves a congressionally created "procedure that gives the public
a role in deciding important questions of public policy." The
Ruckelshaus rationale suggests a means by which courts might well,
in appropriate cases, require agencies to make policy by rule making
rather than by less formal means. When the Ruckelshaus rationale is
combined with the constitutional considerations underlying Hornsby
and Holmes, a powerful weapon against acts of unfettered discretion
seems in the process of being forged.
The other relevant branch of the court's opinion is even more
striking in its language, though perhaps not in its result. The
complaint also challenged the Secretary's failure to exercise his
statutory discretion summarily to suspend registration of a pesticide
pending further administrative proceedings. Finding that the
Secretary had neither given "an adequate explanation for his decision
to deny interim relief in this case" nor issued general regulations or
otherwise articulated the criteria to be applied to individual cases, the
court remanded to the Secretary for "a fresh determination" on the
issue of interim suspension. 2' The court recognized that such
"criteria" might be developed either by "regulations of general
applicability" or by successive ad hoc decisions, but insisted that
criteria and articulated criteria there must be. In view of its holding
18. Id. at 1065.
19. Id. at 1066.
20. Id. at 1064.
21. Id. at 1067.
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that an order denying suspension was subject to judicial review, 22 the
court's remand for failure to articulate reasons could perhaps be
regarded as merely another in the long line of decisions requiring
agencies which issue reviewable orders to give sufficient explanation
to make such review feasible.23 But the court's language indicated that
it took a considerably broader view of the implications of its holding.
In the concluding section of its opinion the court announced a "new
era" in administrative law:
We stand on the threshold of a new era in the history of the long and fruitful
collaboration of administrative agencies and reviewing courts. For many years,
courts have treated administrative policy decisions with great deference,
confining judicial attention primarily to matters of procedure. On matters of
substance, the courts regularly upheld agency action, with a nod in the
direction of the "'substantial evidence" test, and a bow to the mysteries of
administrative expertise. Courts occasionally asserted, but less often exercised,
the power to set aside agency action on the ground that an impermissible factor
had entered into the decision, or a crucial factor had not been considered.
Gradually, however, that power has come into more frequent use, and with it,
the requirement that administrators articulate the factors on which they base
their decisions.
Strict adherence to that requirement is especially important now that the
character of administrative litigation is changing. As a result of expanding
doctrines of standing and reviewability, and new statutory causes of action,
courts are increasingly asked to review administrative action that touches on
fundamental personal interests in life, health, and liberty. These interests have
always had a special claim to judicial protection, in comparison with the
economic interests at stake in a ratemaking or licensing proceeding.
To protect these interests from administrative arbitrariness, it is necessary,
but not sufficient, to insist on strict judicial scrutiny of administrative action.
For judicial review alone can correct only the most egregious abuses. Judicial
review must operate to ensure that the administrative process itself will confine
and control the exercise of discretion. Courts should require administrative
officers to articulate the standards and principles that govern their
discretionary decisions in as much detail as possible. Rules and regulations
should be freely formulated by administrators, and revised when necessary.
Discretionary decisions should more often be supported with findings of fact
and reasoned opinions. When administrators provide a framework for
principled decision-making, the result will be to diminish the importance of
judicial review by enhancing the integrity of the administrative process, and to
improve the quality of judicial review in those cases where judicial review is
sought.4
22. Id. at 1061.
23. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943); American Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 179 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d 554 (D.C.
Cir. 1938).
24. 27 AD. L.2D at 1070.
[Vol. 197 1:51
INFORMAL AGENCY ACTION
Another recent landmark decision from the District of Columbia
Circuit is United States v. Bryant,as in which narcotics investigators
had made, but failed to preserve, a tape of a conversation which the
Government sought to relate to a particular narcotics transaction in
subsequent criminal prosecutions. Holding that the tape was clearly
discoverable and that the duty to disclose on discovery implies a duty
to preserve, the court went on to hold that the sanctions for
nondisclosure--dismissal of the indictment or a new trial-"will be
invoked in the future unless the Government can show that it has
promulgated, enforced and attempted in good faith to follow rigorous
and systematic procedures designed to preserve all discoverable
evidence gathered in the course of a criminal investigation." 26 The
court made it clear that it expected "rules, systematically applied and
systematically enforced" z from each investigative agency. 28 And, as
in Ruckelshaus, the court indicated it was well aware of the broader
implications of its holding:
These cases point up an anomaly of our criminal process: controlled by
rules of law protecting 'adversary rights and procedures at some stages, the
process at other stages is thoroughly unstructured. Beside the carefully
safeguarded fairness of the courtroom is a dark no-man's-land of unreviewed
bureaucratic and discretionary decision making. Too often, what the process
purports to secure in its formal stages can be subverted or diluted in its more
informal stages.2
A somewhat different, but also highly significant, approach was
taken by the Supreme Court in the recent landmark case of Citizens
To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe.30 Citizens groups challenged
a determination by the Secretary of Transportation approving
construction of a highway through a public park. Plaintiffs invoked
statutory provisions forbidding the Secretary to authorize the use of
federal funds to finance construction of highways through public
25. No. 23, 957 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 29, 1971).
26. Id. at 19.
27. Id. at 2.
28. Citing Ruckelshaus and DAViS-INQuIRY, the court declared that "our approach is in
keeping with an incipient but powerful trend in the law-a new refusal to rely blindly upon the
unstructured exercise of official discretion and a new judicial willingness to require
promulgation of and obedience to rules by administrative agencies." No. 23,957 (D.C. Cir. Jan.
29, 1971) at 19. Also cited, as finding "a constitutional basis for the requirement of rule making
by the police," was Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal
Cases, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 785, 814 (1970).
29. No. 23,957 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 29, 1971) at 2.
30. 39 U.S.L.W. 4287 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1971).
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parks if a "feasible and prudent" alternative route is available. If no
such route is available, the Secretary may approve construction only
if there has been "all possible planning to minimize harm to such
park."'3 The Secretary had held no hearing and made no findings.
The Court held that the Secretary's action was neither an
adjudication nor a rule making-that is, that it was an informal
action as the term is used herein. However, the Court held that the
Secretary's action was judicially reviewable as to three issues: whether
the Secretary acted within the scope of his authority; whether the
determination was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion;
and whether applicable procedural requirements were observed. The
Court declined to hold, as petitioners requested, that formal findings
and a statement of reasons were procedurally necessary, but
remanded to the district court "for plenary review of the Secretary's
decision," "based on the full administrative record that was before
the Secretary at the time he made his decision. ' 32 While the Secretary
had introduced affidavits prepared for the litigation, attempting to
support the Secretary's decision, the Court held that "these affidavits
were merely post hoc rationalizations" and "clearly do not constitute
the 'whole record' compiled by the agency: the basis for review
required by § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act. ' ' 3
Recognizing that "the bare-record may not disclose the factors that
were considered or the Secretary's construction of the evidence," the
Court observed that "it may be necessary for the District Court to
require some explanation in order to determine if the Secretary acted
within the scope of his authority and if the Secretary's action was
justifiable under the applicable standard. ' 34 If such additional
explanation should prove to be necessary and the Secretary still
declined to prepare formal findings, then "it may be that the only way
there can be effective judicial review is by examining the
decisionmakers themselves." 3
The Supreme Court did not, as did the District of Columbia
Circuit in Ruckelshaus and Bryant, urge the agency in question to
formulate standards, by rule or or otherwise, for the exercise of its
discretion. That difference in approach may be explained by the fact
31. Department of Transportation Act of 1966, § 4(0, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (Supp. V,
1970); Federal Aid to Highway Act of 1968, § 138, 23 U.S.C. § 138 (Supp. V, 1970).
32. 39 U.S.L.W. at 4293.
33. Id. at 4292.
34. Id. at 4293.
35. Id.
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that the statutes in question themselves provided fully explicit
standards. And, while the Court held that formal findings or a
statement of reasons were not required, it came close to requiring the
agency, in effect, either to make such findings or to be prepared to
testify in court as to its reasons. It seems reasonable to expect that
agencies confronted with these alternatives should and will tend
towards a wider use of formal findings, or at least statements of
reasons, even where those are not statutorily required.
Thus recent decisions indicate that the courts have a promising
role to play in narrowing the areas in which unfettered administrative
discretion operates.36 The Committee on Informal Action of the
Administrative Conference of the United States, under the
chairmanship of Warrer W. Gardner, is approaching the same
problem on two fronts. First, the Committee is developing guidelines
designed to assist agencies in determining when a greater degree of
articulation of standards of policies may be needed and in selecting
the most appropriate means to that end. 37 The Committee has
declared that "there is a growing body of scholarly opinion that an
outstanding failure of the contemporary administrative process is the
failure of the typical agency sufficiently to use the rule-making
process or to clarify the standards which govern its decisions." 38 The
Committee's preliminary draft of guidelines takes the form of 33
penetrating questions3, which each agency might ask itself, together
with a list of factors which the agency might take into account in
36. As this article goes to press the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has suggested that there may be informal actions which "as a matter of elementary
fairness" an agency may not take without providing "reasonable opportunity . . . for
submission of views by those materially affected . Independent Broker-Dealers' Trade
Ass'n v. SEC, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1971).
37. A tentative draft of Guidelines for the Study of Informal A ction in Federal Agencies was
approved by the Committee on April 10, 1970, and was transmitted to both the governmental
and the public members of the Conference for comments.
38. Guidelines. supra note 37, at 2.
39. E.g., "I. To what extent is it feasible for the principles which govern- the agency
function to be reduced to generalized rules and regulations?" Id. at 2. "3. To what extent is it
feasible, when generalized rules are impracticable, to disclose the agency law and policy by
published statements (a) clarifying or making more specific the statutory or agency standards,
(b) describing agency policy, or (c) listing the factors which would enter into discretionary
agency actionT' Id. at 4. '4. To what extent is it feasible, when no more comprehensive rule-
making is practicable, to issue particular rules in the form of advisory interpretations, examples
and hypotheticals?' Id. at 5. "'15. To what extent should the agency advise the public as to the
legality or enforcement consequences of proposed actions by declaratory orders, advisory
opinions or informal adviceT' Id. at 11.
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arriving at its answers." This Socratic approach is most stimulating
and effective. Only a rare agency could seriously go through the
process of self-examination laid out in these guidelines without
becoming aware of a host of ways in which its procedures could be
improved.
Second, the Committee on Informal Action has addressed itself to
specific areas in which it finds that informal action should give way to
more formal procedures or should be accompanied by a greater
degree of articulation. So far the Committee has concluded that
articulation of standards would be desirable concerning specified
functions of two agencies; one agency promptly agreed, and the other
has made partial implementation with the Committee's remaining
recommendations under study.4'
On March 13, 1970, another committee of the Administrative
Conference, the Rulemaking Committee, adopted a resolution42 which
recommended enactment of an amendment to the APA
to the effect that every agency which issues orders affecting substantial interests
of private persons, whether after hearing or through informal action without
40. For example, under Question I reported in note 39 supra, the Committee lists the
following factors as among those relevant to the desirability of an expanded use of generalized
rules: "(a) The degree to which the governing statute is precise or vague. (b) The degree to which
the affected public is ignorant or knowledgeable of the principles which in fact govern agency
action. (c) The degree of practical need by the public for a defined and organized statement of
the rules which control the agency function. (d) The degree of stability or of change in the
development of the agency function; the inquiry is whether rule making can proceed in relative
confidence that new applications and new insights will not in the immediate future make the rule
obsolete. (e) Whether there is a comprehensive body of precedents-in published opinions, filed
letters, internal memoranda or the files and recollections of individual attorneys or
officials-sufficient to support generalization into a rule. (f) Whether as a matter of drafting a
generalized rule could be expressed with reasonable clarity, or whether the governing principles
are so various that a generalized rule would be so complex or so vague as to have little utility. (g)
Whether there is need for speedy publication, so that the procedures suggested under Questions
2, 3, or 4 would be preferable. (h) Whether there is a statutory direction or authority to
promulgate rules and regulations." Id. at 2-4.
41. The Committee's first study dealt with remission and mitigation of forfeitures by the
Criminal Division of the Justice Department. The Committee found that, while the procedures
were generally fair, the Department "had no published regulations regarding the procedural and
substantive aspects of this category of cases," did not make decisions used as precedents
available to the public, and did not uniformly notify unsuccessful applicants of the reasons for
denial. 1969 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 18. The Department agreed to change its
procedures in all these respects.
The Committee's second study, which also found the procedures inadequate, involved "no
action" letters of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Studies of additional procedures,
including those of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, are in progress. Id.
42. Because of reservations on the part of the Council of the Conference, the resolution was
not presented to the June 1970 session of the Conference and has since undergone revision in the
Committee.
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hearing, should, as far as is feasible in the circumstances, state through formal
decisions or general rules, or if that is impractical through policy statements
other than rules, the standards that guide its discretionary determination in
each type of agency action, and from time to time review its rules and policy
statements so that they will reflect the agency's developing experience and
understanding. 3
This recommended statutory language goes no farther than to
state, as a legal rule of general applicability, the doctrine already
suggested in the Holmes, Hornsby, Ruckelshaus, and Bryant cases. If
such statutory language were adopted, agencies would for the first
time be under a degree of general statutory obligation to articulate
their standards and policies rather than formulating those standards
and policies in camera and implementing them as a matter of
unfettered discretion.44 The proposed statutory language is calculated
to allow all reasonable scope for the exercise of agency discretion, the
key language being "as far as is feasible in the circumstances. ' 45
Other escape hatches-for example, "if that is impractical"-are
equally apparent. The significant thing is that an agency's decision
concerning the feasibility and practicality of more formal procedures
in the particular circumstances would be judicially reviewable. The
enactment of such language as that quoted above could have a most
43. This text was based on language suggested to the Committee by Professor Davis. In his
treatise, Professor Davis proposes for consideration a statutory provision which includes
virtually identical language as well as an explicit provision for judicial review. See
DAVIS-TREATISE § 6.13 (1970 Supp.).
44. Such an obligation might have been held to arise from the present language of the APA:
Each agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal Register for the
guidance of the public-
(B) statements of the general course and method by which its functions are channeled
and determined, including the nature and requirements of all formal and informal
procedures available;
(C) rules of procedure .
(D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by law, and
statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability formulated and
adopted by the agency ....
5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(I)(B)-(D) (Supp. V, 1970). However, apparently the only court to deal with
the question held that this section imposes no requirement that regulations be issued but only
that any regulations issued be published. See Gras v. Beechie, 221 F. Supp. 422 (S.D. Tex.
1963).
45. The Committee did not recommend that the new subsection contain any exceptions, even
for such areas as military or foreign affairs functions. Courts construing such a subsection
would undoubtedly take into account, in assessing an agency's claim that promulgation of rules
or articulation of standards is not "feasible in the circumstances," the fact that certain areas,
including military and foreign affairs functions, are traditionally exempt from procedural
requirements. However, no categorical, blanket exception seems necessary or desirable.
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constructive impact in accelerating the development of the law in this
area, would cure a significant defect in the APA, and would go far
toward providing an effective, yet balanced and reasonable, safeguard
against the inappropriate or arbitrary exercise of unfettered
administrative discretion.
In the absence of statutory change, courts nevertheless have
adequate sources of power to compel agencies, where appropriate, to
use more formal procedures and to move toward greater articulation
of standards. As Hornsby and Holmes show, the Constitution is the
ultimate source of that power and is sufficient by itself in aggravated
cases. But a federal court reviewing federal administrative action will
invariably have sources of power short of the Constitution on which
to rely. The statute conferring the administrative power in question
will almost certainly contain a provision which can and should be
read as commanding that the agency act reasonably and in the public
interest, not only in its substantive determinations but also in
affording such structured procedures, articulation of standards, and
public participation as are appropriate in the circumstances to enable
it to make its substantive decisions rationally and fairly." The court
in Ruckelshaus readily found such a mandate in the governing statute.
United States v. Bryant found it in the federal criminal rules
regarding discovery. As has been suggested,47 the APA itself can be
read as embodying a congressional mandate that agencies act by rule
making where it is feasible. In the case of the vast body of agency
actions which are technically informal adjudications, once a court has
found that an action is judicially reviewable at all, it is a short step to
a holding that the basis for agency decision must be sufficiently
articulated to make review feasible. In short, courts are far from
46. The host of modern statutes providing that an administrator shall "take into account"
this or that before doing something cry out for procedural safeguards, or at least articulation of
grounds for decision, if they are not to become dead letters. For example 16 U.S.C. § 470f
(Supp. V, 1970), provides that "the head of any Federal agency. . . shall, prior to the approval
of the expenditure of any Federal funds. . . take into account the effect of the undertaking on
any district, site, building structure, or object that is included in the National Register[of
historic places]." The agency head is directed to afford the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation "a reasonable opportunity to comment," but no other procedural requirements are
stated. Obviously, the policy implemented in this section will remain nothing but a pious hope
unless, at the least, the courts require agencies to explain their decisions and to show how they
have taken the congressional directive into account. Cf. Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir.
1970).
47. See notes 13-24 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 1971:51
INFORMAL AGENCY ACTION
powerless in this area, and their power is one we may expect to see
exercised more frequently than in the past.
II.
The statutory language suggested above, when speaking of the
procedures to be followed whenever feasible and not impractical,
expresses no preference between "formal decisions"-that is,
adjudications on a record-and "general rules" which emerge from
rule-making proceedings. Many of those who have urged the wider use
of more formal procedures in lieu of unfettered agency discretion have
concluded that rule making should be the procedural norm, used
wherever feasible for the formulation of general policies.48 There is
something to be said for this approach, or at least for the more
qualified proposition that rule making should be expanded somewhat
at the expense of adjudication. However, for what appears to be a
complex amalgam of reasons, by no means all of them invalid,49 a
number of agencies have developed a strong preference for
adjudication and have rarely used rule-making procedures. In some
areas and circumstances agencies can probably proceed most
effectively by developing the law, as courts do, through successive
formal adjudications. Almost any formal adjudication, moreover,
48. E.g., Baker, Policy by Rule or Ad Hoc Approach- Which'Should It Be?, 22 LAW &
CONrEMP. PROB. 659 (1957). The NLRB, in particular, has been sharply criticized for its failure
to use rule-making procedures. See Operating Eng'rs Local 49 v. NLRB, 353 F.2d 852, 856
(D.C. Cir. 1965), and authorities there cited; Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Power of the
National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J: 729 (1961). For comprehensive reviews of the
literature and some shrewd suggestions, see Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy:
Another Look at Rule-Making and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118
U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Robinson]; Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking
or Adjudication in the Development ofAdministrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965).
The so-called "Ash Council" Report assails agencies for excessive case-by-case adjudication
and recommends a wider use, as a basis for policy formulation, of "less formal procedures such
as exchanges of written or oral information, informal regulatory guidance, or rule making."
THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, A NEW REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK: REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES 5 (1971). See also
id. at 21, 49. The exhortation to greater use of rule making is hardly surprising, but the
recommendation that "informal procedures" be more widely used, id. at 21, might appear on its
face to be in conflict with the view expressed herein that less rather than more informal action is
needed. The report does not discuss in any detail the types of informal procedures which are
contemplated.
49. See Robinson 488 n.15; Shapiro, supra note 48, at 926-29, 942-58. See also In re
Petitions filed by Best, CCC, and others for Rule Making to clarify standards in all comparative
broadcast proceedings, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 18 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 1523
(1970).
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involves the declaration of principles that will be applicable to persons
and cases other than those directly involved, and the cases holding
that, in general, an agency is entitled to choose which method it wishes
to employ5° appear to be sound. While various attempts have been
made to draw general or abstract lines separating areas especially
appropriate for formal adjudication from those more appropriate for
rule making, none of these attempts has won general acceptance and
the exercise seems somewhat unprofitable. The present writer would
certainly not match his "litmus paper" against Judge Friendly's in
this area, and the jurist has said that his is inadequate.5 Rather than
focusing on drawing such a line, it seems wiser to move toward a
flexibility that would make available in each proceeding, no matter
how labeled, those procedural opportunities and devices most
appropriate for the resolution of the particular issues involved.
A considerable difference in outlook on this point may arise
between the academic approach, in which the formulation of general
rules in rule-making proceedings with broad public participation may
seem particularly inviting, and that of the practicing lawyer. The
latter tends to be convinced that in determining factual disputes "the
truth is most likely to be refined and discovered in the crucible of an
evidentiary hearing."' 2 He is likely to be deeply suspicious of any
movement toward the greater use of a procedure which would deprive
him of safeguards and opportunities which he by experience considers
critically effective in protecting his client's interest: evidentiary
hearings with the right of cross-examination; findings of fact and
conclusions of law, with the agency at least ostensibly limited in the
grounds for its decision to matter appearing of record; and judicial
50. E.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); NLRB v. A.P.W. Prods. Co., 316
F.2d 899, 905 (2d Cir. 1963).
51. Friendly, supra note 6, at 869. "The line between these two functions is not always a
clear one and in fact the two functions merge at many points." NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.,
394 U.S. 759, 770 (1969) (Black, J., concurring). See also Regular Common Carrier Conf. v.
United States, 307 F. Supp. 941 (D.D.C. 1969); 1 DAVIS-TREATISE § 5.01, at 285; Bernstein,
The Regulatory Process: A Framework for Analysis, 26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 329, 331-33
(1961); Friendly, supra note 6, at 869-70. One aspect of this question was at the heart of Wyman.
Gordon. supra, where the Court (6-3 on this issue) held that a rule adopted in an adjudicatory
proceeding for prospective application only was invalid as a rule. However, a plurality of the
court held the agency free to apply the legal principle embodied in the rule in successive
adjudications. For a thorough and constructive discussion of this perplexing case and its
implications, see Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970).
52. The Citizens Comm. v. FCC, 436 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see Reflections on the
Conduct of an Administrative Hearing, 20 AD. L. REv. 101, 105-06 (1967).
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review of the evidence within the limitations of the "substantial
evidence" test. To the practicing lawyer, alleged administrative
expertise-generally a more weighty factor in rule making than in
adjudication -seems significant largely as a rationale by which the
agency can escape having its decision tested on review, with some
degree of rigor, against a record which the lawyer can play some part
in making.53 While it is true that review of an agency rule can be
sought on the ground that it is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion,5 the experience of most practicing lawyers is undoubtedly
that the characteristics of an adjudicatory proceeding generally mean
that the weaknesses of a decision in such a proceeding can be attacked
far more effectively on review than can perhaps equally significant
weaknesses in a decision promulgating a rule. 5 To a considerable
extent, then, with limited exceptions both agencies and the lawyers
practicing before them, though largely for different reasons, would
oppose any drastic curtailment of adjudication in favor of the more
theoretically tidy and logical rule-making device.
The debate, while largely inconclusive, is by no means academic
since much can turn on the procedural opportunities that are
available. Under the scheme of the APA, the principle advantages of
rule making are prior public notice of the terms or substance of the
proposed rule, or at least of the subject matter and issues involved in
the proceeding,5" and an opportunity for all interested persons to
participate. The principal advantages of a formal adjudication are the
53. See Robinson 519-20. As is perhaps obvious, this assessment of rule making is addressed
to rule makings subject only to the provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 553 (Supp. V, 1970), not to
proceedings which-though technically rule makings-are "required by statute to be made on
the record after opportunity for an agency hearing," id. § 553(c), and thus share many of the
procedural characteristics of adjudications. See Robinson 486 n.5. But see note 63 infra.
54. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (Supp. V, 1970).
55. See DAVIS-TREATISE §30.10 (1970 Supp.); Robinson 488 n.15, 527-28. Contra,
Shapiro, supra note 48, at 941, 944-47.
56. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (Supp. V, 1970). Of course an agency may modify a'proposed rule
in the course of the proceeding, e.g., California Citizens Band Ass'n v. United States, 375 F.2d
43 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 844 (1967), and may to some degree alter or expand the
subject matter and issues involved. But unless the notice provision of section 553 is a nullity, an
agency must at some point provide a new notice before making changes in the course of the
proceeding that substantially alter the impact on interested parties. Cf Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v.
United States, 242 F. Supp. 414 (N.D. Ill. 1965). In the California Citizens Band case, supra,
the court went to considerable lengths to show that the charges were indeed fairly trivial and of
no real significance. While the present writer knows of no decided case in which a notice has been
held statutorily insufficient in light of the rule finally adopted, he has experienced cases in which,
in his opinion, that issue should have been raised and should have been determined adversely to
the agency.
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right to an evidentiary hearing with the right both to present evidence
and to cross-examine, the requirement of an agency decision founded
on the record, and judicial review of the evidence. In each case these
are only minimal requirements; there is no statutory reason why an
agency, even in a proceeding labeled "rule making," may not
incorporate some or all of the procedures characteristic to an
adjudication and vice versa.-7 The principal thesis of the remainder of
this article is that in at least a significant number of instances agencies
should thus exercise their discretion to fashion hybrid or
conglomerate procedural devices which would utilize those
characteristics of both adjudication and rule making that are most
appropriate in light of the circumstances and issues of the particular
case. It is submitted, further, that, like any other exercise of agency
discretion, an agency's decision whether to employ procedural devices
not uniformly required by statute is subject to judicial review for
abuse of discretion and should be set aside when such abuse is found.
One area in which such procedural inventiveness may be not only
desirable but obligatory is suggested by the line of cases holding that,
even where a right to formal adjudication is expressly created by
statute, an agency may have the power effectively to foreclose that
apparent right by deciding, in a rule-making proceeding of general
applicability, some or even all of the issues which would determine the
result of the statutorily required adjudication. The courts have
consistently held that where an entire class of persons similarly
situated is involved, particularly if the class is a large one, an agency
may proceed by rule making rather than by repeated adjudications
involving similar or identical issues.58 The landmark cases hold that
the statutory requirement of a "hearing" is satisfied if the agency
57. The opportunity to participate in rule making given to interested persons by 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(c) (Supp. V, 1970) involves participation "through submission of written data, views, or
arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation." Id. It can hardly be doubted that
the "with or without" language invokes agency discretion, not acts of pure grace.
58. See FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.,
351 U.S. 192 (1956); Pacific & Southern Co. v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1968), WBEN,
Inc. v. United States, 396 F.2d 601, 617-18 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 914 (1968); Conley
Electronics Corp. v. FCC, 394 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1968); Pacific Coast European Conf. v.
FMC, 376 F.2d 785 (D.C. Cir. 1967); California Citizens Band Ass'n v. United States, 375 F.2d
43 (9th Cir. 1967); American Airlines" Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied.385
U.S. 843 (1966) (the "Blocked Space" case); Capitol Airways v. CAB, 292 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir.
1961); Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960); Regular Common Carrier
Conf. v. United States, 307 F. Supp. 941 (D.D.C. 1969); Borden Co. v. Freeman, 256 F. Supp.
592 (D.N.J.), affd. 369 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 992 (1967). See also
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formulates a general rule in a proceeding conforming to the rule-
making provisions of the APA and makes available a meaningful
procedure by which an applicant may obtain a "full hearing" upon
setting forth "reasons, sufficient if true, to justify a change or waiver
of" the general rule. 51 In general, while the results reached by the
courts seem defensible, the substitution of a rule making for an
adjudication may impose upon the agency an obligation to
supplement the minimum rule-making procedure required by statute
through the use of procedural devices adequate for the resolution of
the issues presented.
A -classic example is Air Line Pilots Association v. Quesada,0
where a statute provided that no certified pilot could be deprived of his
certificate without an adjudication and an evidentiary hearing.
However, the court upheld the Federal Aviation Administrator's
promulgation, by rule-making procedure and without an evidentiary
hearing, of a regulation that all pilots would lose their certificates
upon reaching the age of 60. Reasoning that it would be impractical
to hold individual hearings to determine if each of the thousands of
airline pilots was still physically fit at 60, the reviewing court
approved the Administrator's action on the ground that the statutory
right to an adjudication had no application to the formulation of a
general rule. The petitioners had taken an "all or nothing" approach
on review, insisting that no individual certificate could be modified
without an individual adjudication,"' and the court's rejection of this
argument has considerable appeal even in the face of the apparent
statutory requirement.
One may suppose that if the petitioners had been both more
modest and more specific in their demands, they might have had a
Note, The Use ofAgency Rulemaking To Deny Adjudications Apparently Required by Statute,
54 IOWA L. REv. 1086 (1969). Virtually the only case that has gone the other way is Philadelphia
Co. v. SEC, 175 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1958), vacated as moot, 337 U.S. 901 (1959), in which what
purported to be a general rule was held a disguised penalty against individuals. See Robinson
supra note 48, at 501-02. The FTC's assertion of authority to promulgate "trade regulation
rules" which would be conclusive in subsequent adjudications presents special problems,
including the use of "official notice," which are outside the scope of this article though
intimately related to the questions here discussed. See id. at 490-96.
59. United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956); see FPC v. Texaco,
Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964).
60. 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960).
61. Dissenting in the "Blocked Space" case, Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger argued with
considerable force that the holding in Air Line Pilots was unnecessary since the pilots'
certificates contained an express condition subjecting their terms to subsequently adopted FAA
regulations. 359 F.2d at 636.
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greater chance of success. Suppose that, without challenging across
the board the agency's decision to proceed by rule making, or as an
alternative to such a challenge, they had sought an evidentiary hearing
on such issues as the age at which a majority of pilots are no longer
physically fit to retain their certificates or the feasibility of handling
the problem on an individual basis by requiring periodic physical
examinations or by some similar means. These may or may not be
"legislative facts," in Professor Davis' sense,62 but they seem
perfectly well adapted to constructive development through an
evidentiary hearing. If the agency had agreed to hold hearings limited
to such issues and had then set the "retirement" age at a point
manifestly not justified by the evidence or had imposed a blanket
retirement age without allowing for exceptions and without
considering feasible alternatives even though the evidence had shown
that they were available, the reviewing court might well have been
persuaded, whether under the "arbitrary and capricious" test or
under some other formula, to set the rule aside. And the court would
likely have been somewhat more willing to do this because of the
statutory requirement of an evidentiary hearing in individual cases,
even though the court took the view that this requirement did not
directly apply because of the general nature of the rule in question.
In the class of cases under discussion, the opinions are not devoid
of hints that a petitioner would be wise, rather than demanding a full
statutory adjudication as a matter of right,6 3 to specify what
procedures, not normally required in a rule-making proceeding, he
considers appropriate in the particular circumstances of the case."
62. See note 81 infra and accompanying text.
63. Even in certain proceedings-rule makings-on-a-record and adjudications involving
"claims for money or benefits or applications for initial licenses"-conducted pursuant to 5
U.S.C. §§ 556-57 (Supp. V, 1970), an agency may escape an evidentiary hearing by invoking
section 556(d), which provides that in these classes of cases "an agency may, when a party will
not be prejudiced thereby, adopt procedures for the submission of all or part of the evidence in
written form." Id. § 556(d). Rejecting the plaintiff's claim of prejudice, the court in Long
Island R.R. v. United States, 318 F. Supp. 490 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), allowed the agency to escape
by this route, largely on the ground that plaintiff had not adequately "pointed to specifics on
which it needed to cross-examine or present live rebuttal testimony." Id. at 499. This holding
underlines the importance of a timely and specific offer of proof if an oral hearing is to be sought
successfully.
64. A passage in the Blocked Space opinion has become famous in this respect:
We might view the case differently if we were not confronted solely with a broad
conceptual demand for an adjudicatory-type proceeding. . . . Nowhere in the record is
there any specific proffer by petitioners as to the subjects they believed required oral
hearings, what kinds of facts they proposed to adduce, and by what witnesses, etc. Nor
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Under the exhaustion rule, the plaintiff would of course first have to
direct his request to the agency. If a party contends and demonstrates
that the rule making necessarily involves a decision of matters of
disputed fact, requests an evidentiary hearing, and makes an offer of
proof of his version of the facts, it is submitted that a reviewing court
could and should require the agency either to grant the requested
hearing or to give, in its decision, a reasoned explanation for a denial.
Various reasons might support such a denial; the most obvious would
be a soundly based agency explanation that, even if the facts which the
party offered to prove were correct, its rule would still be warranted
for reasons which it states." The point is that an agency decision to
reject such an offer of proof in a rule-making proceeding in which an
evidentiary hearing could be ordered by the agency, but is not
uniformly required by statute, is just as much an exercise of agency
discretion as is adoption of substantive rules and is judicially
reviewable under the "arbitrary, capricious, or abuse of discretion"
test. While I know of no decided case-with one very recent
exception-in which an agency denial of such an offer of proof in a
rule-making proceeding has been reversed as an abuse of discretion,"
was there any specific proffer as to particular lines of cross-examination which required
exploration at an oral hearing. 359 F.2d at 632-33.
Unfortunately, the court largely vitiated this pragmatic approach by a retreat into the
"legislative fact" mystique, thereby becoming at least as "conceptual" as petitioners. See notes
8 1-83 infra and accompanying text.
65. Cf. Siegel v. AEC, 400 F.2d 778,782, 784-85 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
66. In National Air Carrier Ass'n v. CAB, 436 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1970), plaintiff
contended that CAB approval of an airline agreement under section 412 of the Federal Aviation
Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1964), which contains no hearing requirement, nevertheless was invalid
without an evidentiary hearing on the facts of the case because of the serious factual issues
involved. While the court rejected the contention, it did so only after a fairly detailed analysis of
the issues and after a bow to
principles gleaned from a number of recent administrative law decisions, principles which
can be summarized in the statement that the need for an evidentiary hearing is
particularly acute when the issue presented is one which possesses a great substantive
importance, or one which is unusually complex or difficult to resolve on the basis of
pleadings and argument. Id. at 191 (citing the Marine Space Enclosures and Allegan
County cases cited in notes 77-78 infra).
In Upjohn Co. v. Finch, 422 F.2d 944, 955 (6th Cir. 1970), the court held that, regardless of
whether a challenged order by the Commissioner of Food and Drugs removing certain drugs
from the market constituted adjudication or rule making, the test of whether an evidentiary
hearing was required was whether "a genuine and substantial issue of fact" had been raised by
means of an offer of proof. The court held that the required showing had not been made,
although ample opportunity had been afforded. In American Home Prods. Corp. v. Finch, 303
F. Supp. 448 (D. Del. 1969), a preliminary injunction was granted against similar action by the
Commissioner of Food and Drugs. Without discussing the rule making-adjudication question,
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such decisions will be made in the future if counsel are imaginative in
anticipating the specific procedures they need to present their case and
in demonstrating to the agency-and, when necessary, to a reviewing
court-why such procedures are appropriate in the circumstances.
The exception mentioned above is Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin7
in which the court granted declaratory relief to parties challenging
regulations of the Department of Agriculture respecting the size of
imported tomatoes. The regulations were issued pursuant to an earlier
"marketing order" which in turn was issued pursuant to section 8c of
the Agriculture Marketing Agreement Act of 1937.65 The statutory
requirement of notice and hearing prior to the issuance of marketing
orders had been complied with. The marketing order itself, however,
did not require notice and hearing prior to the issuance of regulations.
The Department, regarding the regulations as rules, had issued a
notice of proposed rule making and invited and accepted written
presentations, but had not provided an oral hearing. The court did not
the court held on the basis of the particular statutory scheme involved that a right to an
evidentiary hearing was established by the presentation of "meritorious, non-frivolous
objections, which could most appropriately be resolved finally after a full hearing." Id. at 454.
In Law Motor Freight, Inc. v. CAB, 364 F.2d 139 (Ist Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905
(1967), the court rejected a contention that a hearing had been wrongfully denied on finding that
the administrative proceeding in question was a rule making, not an adjudication. The court
seemed to take the view that its conclusion followed automatically unless a constitutional right
to a hearing could be established. The court's analysis is faulty in not considering whether denial
of a hearing was an abuse of discretion. The court, however, went on to apply the "substantial
evidence" test and in that connection observed that "we suspect that further accumulation or
data would not have greatly assisted the Board," 364 F.2d at 145, and that petitioner had had an
opportunity "to submit relevant facts" in writing and had not done so. Id.
In Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), the court upheld a "ruling,"
promulgated without even an ordinary rule-making proceeding although with an opportunity for
ex post facto "petitions for review." Requiring the broadcast of anti-smoking messages by
stations carrying cigarette advertising, the ruling was premised on agency declarations to the
effect
(I) that cigarette advertising inherently promotes cigarette smoking as a desirable habit,
(2) that very substantial medical and scientific authority regards this habit as highly
dangerous to health and therefore undesirable, and (3) that in view of the volume of
cigarette advertising, existing sources were inadequate to inform the public of the nature
and extent of the danger. Id. at 1104.
These are factual matters, certainly, and at least some of them are not altogether self-evident.
While agreeing that "as a general rule . . . more careful procedures are required to support
innovation by an administrative agency," id. at 1104, the court held that the Commission's
premises were "supported by the record." Id. The "record" was, in fact, virtually nonexistent.
The court was correct, however, in pointing out that the parties requesting an evidentiary
hearing had made no detailed and specific offer of proof.
67. No. -. (D.C. Cir. March 19, 1971).
68. 7 U.S.C. § 608c (1964).
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challenge the Department's classification of the proceeding as a rule
making and expressly declined to hold that every regulation pursuant
to a marketing order required the same notice and hearing necessary
for a marketing order itself. However, observing that "it is not the
case that all administrative actions legitimately denominated
regulations are ipso facto freed from any need for oral hearings,"69 the
court held that in view of the issues involved in the proceeding,
including claims that the regulation discriminated against importers
and that its adoption had been unduly influenced by domestic
producers, the importers had a right to oral hearing since their claim
that an effective showing required oral presentation to Department
officials, including cross-examination if that proved to be necessary
for fairness, was not insubstantial.
The court was undoubtedly somewhat influenced by the facts that
notice and hearing were required for marketing orders, and that if the
Department could unrestrictedly adopt regulations without a hearing,
the congressional purpose could be circumvented by the issuance of
marketing orders in the most general terms, with the real policy
decisions being "taken by 'regulation' providing opportunity only for
written comments. ' 70 However, the decision does plainly stand for the
landmark proposition that there are circumstances in which courts
may and will require the holding of evidentiary hearings in rule-
making proceedings, and it holds that the record before the court
showed the existence of such circumstances.
The inquiry here suggested is not unlike that involved under the
provision of the Federal Communications Act which ordains that a
hearing need be held on a license application only if "a substantial
and material question of fact is presented or the Commission for any
reason is unable to make the finding" that the public interest would
be served by granting the application. 71 In that context, the courts
have held that
as a general matter, the federal regulatory agencies should construe pleadings
filed before them so as to raise rather than avoid important questions. They
69. No. - at 12. For this proposition the court cited the Blocked Space case, cited in
note 58 supra, and Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385-86 (1908). The holding in the latter
case was that a state denied fourteenth amendment due process by finally fixing tax assessments
(which were not judicially reviewable) without affording the taxpayer an opportunity to be heard
orally, with "the right to support his allegations by argument however brief, and, if need be, by
proof, however informal." Id. at 386.
70. 4o .- at 12.71. 47 U.S.C. § 309(c) (1964).
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"should not adopt procedures that foreclose full inquiry into broad public
interest questions, either patent or latent.
72
In these cases, as in others, agency action has been reversed for tailure
either to hold an evidentiary hearing or to give an adequate or sus-
tainable explanation of why none was necessary.7 3 In a different, but
again analogous, statutory context, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit has observed:
In this case, as in many others, the Commission has claimed to be the
representative of the public interest. This role does not permit it to act as an
umpire blandly calling balls and strikes for adversaries appearing before it; the
right of the public must receive active and affirmative protection at the hands
of the Commission."'
These authorities suggest that, in the rule-making area also, an agency
fails to perform its duty if it construes an offer of proof narrowly or
requires an unduly burdensome showing when an evidentiary hearing
is sought.
The point is not limited to an evidentiary hearing, though that is
the most conspicuous procedure which is not required in all rule
makings, but which may be called for in particular cases. Oral
argument is not as a general matter required in rule-making
proceedings either, but it is posssible to imagine cases in which its
denial might be an abuse of discretion.7" Addressed to some or all
72. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 880 v. FCC, 436 F.2d 248, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(quoting Midwestern Gas Transmission Co. v. FPC, 258 F.2d 660, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1958)).
73. See The Citizens Comm. v. FCC, 436 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Joseph v. FCC, 404
F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v. FCC,
359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); cf L. B. Wilson, Inc. v. FCC, 397 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
74. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965).
75. American Export & Isbrandtsen Lines v. FMC, 334 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1964), held that
oral argument satisfies a statutory requirement of a "full hearing" when no genuine and
material issue of disputed fact is present. Accord, Los Angeles v. FMC, 388 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir.
1967); NLRB v. Bata Shoe Co., 377 F.2d 821 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 917 (1967);
Persian Gulf Outward Freight Conf. v. FMC, 375 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Producers
Livestock Marketing Ass'n v. United States, 241 F.2d 192 (10th Cir. 1957), affd sub nom.,
Denver Union Stockyard Co. v. Producers Livestock Mkt'g Ass'n, 356 U.S. 282 (1958). This
entirely reasonable rule is, of course, simply the administrative procedure equivalent of
summary judgment in the courts. One way of determining whether such summary judgment
disposition is appropriate is through use of a show-cause procedure in which the agency presents
the parties with tentative findings and conclusions and the opportunity to file objections,
supported with detailed materials, designating the findings objected to and showing what
evidence they would produce at a hearing. 20 AD. L. REv., supra note 52, at 123-24, 139. This or
some other type of "tentative statement of agency or staff views," Friendly, supra note 6, at
1296, could usefully sharpen the issues and present the question whether an evidentiary hearing is
needed in a highly specific context. The FCC has recently proposed new procedures for summary
[Vol. 1971:51
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issues, either oral argument, an evidentiary hearing, or both may be
highly appropriate in various rule-making proceedings. On some
issues an investigatory type of hearing-that is, one without the right
or cross-examination-might be most appropriate. Conceivably, in
some cases discovery proceedings may be enough; 76 an on-the-record
conference procedure is another possibility."
A most suggestive discussion of the types of flexible procedural
devices that may be available is contained in Judge Leventhal's
opinion in Marine Space Enclosures, Inc. v. Federal Maritime
Commission.7 The court remanded for failure to hold a statutorily
required hearing, placing "[t]he burden . . . not on the person who
wants an unusual hearing (as in the case of rule making, or waiver)
but on the agency desiring the unusual dispensation from hearing. 79
However, the court's discussion of possible procedural devices,
focusing on the particular circumstances and issues in the case, is
highly suggestive of how a request for a hearing in a rule-making
proceeding should also be approached.
The requirement of a hearing in a proceeding before an administrative agency
may be satisfied by something less time-consuming than courtroom drama. In
some cases briefs and oral argument may suffice for disposition.
Whether brief and oral argument are sufficient depends on the nature of the
issues. There is more need for an evidentiary hearing when there are underlying
questions of fact. The kind of procedure that is appropriate may turn on
whether the issue is one that involves a technical judgment . . . and the
importance of the underlying substantive issue.
Even though there may be no disputed "adjudicatory" facts, the
application of the law to the underlying facts involves the kind ofjudgment that
benefits from ventilation at a formal hearing. In some cases, however, the
public hearing may usefully approach the legislative rather than the
adjudicatory model.
decision in adjudicatory hearing cases when there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact."
FCC News, Report No. 4180, Feb. 4, 1971. See generally E. Gellhorn & Robinson, Summary
Judgment in Administrative Adjudication, 84 HARV. L. REv. 612 (1971).
76. Cf. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 880 v. FCC, 436 F.2d 248 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
77. See Citizens for Allegan County, Inc. v. FPC, 414 F.2d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1969); 20 AD. L.
REv., supra note 52, at 103-04.
78. 420 F.2d 577, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also First Nat'l Bank v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267,
273 (4th Cir. 1965) (Sobeloff, J., dissenting); Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. United States,
413 F.2d 568 (Ct. Cl. 1969); DAVIS-TREATISE §§ 7.01, 7.16, 7.20 (1970 Supp.); Westwood,
Administrative Proceedings: Technique of Presiding, 50 A.B.A.J. 659 (1964); Ross, The Big
Administrative Proceeding: A Response to Mr. Westwood, 51 A.B.A.J. 239 (1965).
79. 420 F.2d at 587 n.26.
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Even in the most formal proceedings a capable hearing officer can evolve
techniques that both expedite the proceeding and illuminate the issues.
It may be that the issues can be adequately developed for Commission
determination through receipt of documents and sworn statements, and hearing
oral argument. Any evidentiary hearing may be limited to certain specific
issues.10
While the need for such supplementary procedures may be
particularly conspicuous where the subject of the rule impinges to a
greater or lesser extent in an area where a statutory right to an
adjudication is involved, the need is not limited to such cases. In any
case where a rule-making proceeding involves a contested issue of fact
which has a vital bearing on the reasonableness of the rule and which
is readily susceptible to the taking of evidence, an agency may well
abuse its discretion ifit fails to conduct an evidentiary hearing even in
an area where no statutory right to an adjudication is involved.
In one significant respect, it seems to this writer that some courts
are moving backwards, rather than forwards, toward an abstract
conceptualism and away from the pragmatic approach here
recommended. At this point I must, not without temerity, take issue
with Professor Davis, for what I have in mind is some of the
consequences of his famous distinction between "adjudicative" and
"legislative" facts. "Adjudicative facts are facts about the parties
and their activities, businesses and properties . . . .Legislative facts
do not usually concern the immediate parties but are generally facts
which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and
discretion."18' In general, Davis' view is that adjudicative facts are
suitable for resolution in a full evidentiary hearing with cross-
examination, while legislative facts do not require such a hearing.
Many courts have adopted the theory and, on occasion, have justified
denial of an evidentiary hearing merely by classifying factual issues as
"legislative" without any further analysis.82 Even aside from the
80. Id. at 589-90 & n.36. The court suggested in Marine Space Enclosures and held in City of
Portland v. FMC, 433 F.2d 502 (D.C. Cir. 1970), that where the agency pleads urgency the
proper solution is an expedited hearing. The length and confusion of a hearing may often be very
substantially ameliorated by pr -hearing procedures, as the Administrative Conference has
recommended. See 20 AD. L. REv., supra note 52, at 102-04, 140-41.
81. 1 DAVIS-TREATiSE § 7.02, at 413. The theory was first stated in Davis, An Approach
to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REv. 364, 402 (1942). See
also Gellhorn, Administrative Procedure Reform: Hardy Perennial, 48 A.B.A.J. 243 (1962).
82. For a thoroughgoing review of these cases, see DAVIS-TREATI SE §§ 7.01-.04, 7.06,
15.00-.14 (1970 Supp.).
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frequent difficulty of classification, which Davis acknowledges, s3 the
present writer is wholly unconvinced that a "legislative" fact is
necessarily unsuitable for ventilation at an evidentiary hearing.
Among the types of facts which have been called "legislative" are
those involving "the general characteristics of an industry"84 and
questions regarding the probable impact of proposed regulation.9
Doubtless such issues may involve imponderables; yet it seems clear
that evidentiary presentation, including cross-examination, may often
be of great value. An "expert" making "estimates" or "forecasts"
necessarily makes certain assumptions, relies on certain data, and
engages in certain intellectual processes which he regards as rational.
Why is it necessarily not useful to require him to testify about these
matters, subject to cross-examination, rather than allowing him to
hide behind the anonymous expertise of an agency opinion writer?
Robinson makes a telling point when he observes that
a judgment on policy or "legislative fact" invariably involves an admixture of
particular facts, opinions, and biases, some of which may and some of which
may not be appropriate for exploration by testimony and cross-examination.
To say categorically that general policy questions or "legislative facts" cannot
fruitfully be explored by testimonial procedures and cross-examination is to
generalize to an extent which can only obscure analysis."
At one point in his most recent discussion, Davis concedes that
"full trial" which is "normally required for disputed and critical
adjudicative facts" is also "often desirable, though not required, for
disputed and critical legislative facts. 87 If "full trial" is "desirable,"
and if an agency has discretion to conduct such a trial, as agencies
generally do, then why is such a trial not "required" in the sense that
failure of the agency to afford it is an abuse of discretion for which its
decision may be reversed by a reviewing court? And even if in the
circumstances a full evidentiary hearing should not be required,
administrative fiat couched in terms of unfathomable expertise is not
the only alternative: still remaining is the whole panoply of
intermediate procedural devices which have already been mentioned. s8
83. Id. § 15.03, at 528.
84. WBEN, Inc. v. United States, 396 F.2d 601, 618 (2d Cir. 1968).
85. American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1966). "It is the kind of issue
involving expert opinions and forecasts, which cannot be decisively resolved by testimony. It is
the kind of issue where a month of experience will be worth a year of hearings." Id. at 633. This
conclusion is, in the writer's judgment, effectively criticized by Robinson. See Robinson, supra
note 48, at 503-06.
86. Robinson, supra note 48, at 521.
87. DAViS-TREATISE § 15.00, at 509 (1970 Supp.).
88. See notes 76-80 supra and accompanying text.
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Davis makes a constructive suggestion in his reformulation of the
proposed rule on judicial notice of the Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States. While the rule by its terms applies only to adjudications by
courts, Davis recognizes that, if adopted, it is likely soon to be applied
to agencies as well. 89 The rule, as reformulated by Davis, expressly
applies to legislative as well as adjudicative facts and provides that
"adjudicative facts which are not critical to the controversy and facts
which are legislative or not clearly adjudicative may be noticed if the
court believes them, whether or not they are subject to reasonable
dispute."9 The rule goes on to provide that
upon notification that facts are about to be or have been noticed, any party
adversely affected shall have opportunity to show that the facts are not
properly noticed or that alternative facts should be noticed. The court in its
discretion shall determine whether written presentations suffice, or whether
oral argument, oral evidence, or cross-examination is appropriate in the
circumstances."
This formula would be eminently appropriate for rule-making
proceedings as well as for adjudications. This is a far cry from a
simplistic view that once a fact has been classified as "legislative" an
agency has carte blanche to resolve it any way it wishes, at least in a
rule-making proceeding. This cannot be what Davis means; yet it is
what a number of courts seem to have taken him to mean, and it is
puzzling that he has not criticized them for the oversimplification.92 I
submit that the distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts
may have done more harm than good and that even if a fact can
clearly be classified as one or the other, that classification alone sheds
very little-if any-light on what procedures are most appropriate for
resolving the issue.
89. DAVIs-TREATISE § 15.00, at 507 (1970 Supp.).
90. Id. at 526. "Adjudicative facts that are critical to the controversy shall be noticed only if
they are generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the court or not subject to
reasonable dispute."
91. Id. at 526-27. See also id. § 15.09.
92. Davis' approach to judicial notice seems difficult to reconcile with his criticism of ABC
Air Freight Co. v. CAB, 391 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1968). In that case the agency did hold an
evidentiary hearing, and its decision was reversed as not supported by substantial evidence.
Davis attacks the decision on the ground that, since the proceeding was a rule making and the
facts in question were legislative, "findings supported by evidence are not required."
DAVIS-TREATISE § 7.01, at 319 (1970 Supp.). Perhaps the court should have couched its
holding in terms of arbitrariness or abuse of discretion, but its general approach seems an
excellent example of the sort of critical judicial review that is essential if agencies are to be held
to meaningful standards of rationality in exercising their discretionary powers.
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III.
The discussion in the previous section contended that one means
by which individual rights and interests can be better safeguarded in
the rule-making context is through agency utilization, in the rule-
making proceeding itself, of procedural devices not uniformly
required by statute. But one more factor must be considered: the
courts have recognized that the very legitimacy of the use of rule
making to formulate general policy which affects individual rights
rests largely on the availability of'a reasonable and effective
opportunity for requesting an exception to-or waiver of-a rule
already in effect.93 While the need for a meaningful waiver procedure
is particularly acute in the case of rules whose effect may limit or
impinge upon an otherwise existing statutory right to an
adjudication,9" the need is not limited; any agency having a duty to
serve the public interest "must be ready to waive . ..general
requirements where the public interest would require such a waiver."s
Of course a waiver, or even a hearing on a waiver application,
cannot be granted upon a mere request. The applicant must show
colorable grounds for his request, and if he demands a hearing he
must offer with particularity to show pertinent facts which, if proved,
would justify the waiver." On the other hand, an agency must
consider the merits of a waiver application and, if it rejects the
application, must give a meaningful statement of its reasons." Thus a
93. See FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.,
351 U.S. 192 (1956).
94. See 351 U.S. 192 (1956); WBEN, Inc. v. United States, 396 F.2d 601, 618 (2d Cir.
1968).
95. 560 Broadcast Corp. v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1166, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
96. See Rio Grande Family Radio Fellowship, Inc. v. FCC, 406 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
see also 418 F.2d at 1167.
97. Obviously the mere observation that the application is not in accordance with the rule
from which a waiver is sought is not sufficient. WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir.
1969); Community Serv., Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 709 (6th Cir. 1969). However,
reviewing courts are naturally hesitant to require an agency to carry out extensive waiver
proceedings once it has carefully promulgated a general rule. Thus, a heavy burden has
been placed upon one seeking a waiver to demonstrate that his arguments are
substantially different from those which have been carefully considered at the rulemaking
proceeding.
Industrial Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 437 F.2d 680, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
In Pikes Peak Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 422 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1969), the court, in holding an
offer of proof insufficient to require a hearing on a waiver application, set the standards for such
an offer so high as to make their satisfaction almost impossible. Chief Judge Bazelon seemed on
sounder ground when, dissenting in part, he argued that the offer of proof was adequate to
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non-frivolous request for a waiver, like a request that the agency
employ procedures beyond those uniformly required by statute during
the rule-making proceeding itself, is addressed to agency discretion.
Either refusal to grant the request for waiver or refusal to grant a
hearing on the request is subject to judicial review and may be
reversed if shown to be arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion.
What allegations, when supported by an offer of proof by the
party seeking a waiver, should obligate an agency to hold an
evidentiary hearing or to explain why such a hearing is unnecessary?
Allegations that application of the rule would not be in the public
interest because of the special facts of the case should have this result.
What about an allegation, coupled with an offer of proof, that the rule
is unsound because its adoption was based on an erroneous belief as to
material facts? While this has theoretical appeal, the practical
consequences of requiring an agency to hold hearings 'on repeated
challenges to the factual conclusions underlying a rule would
probably be crippling and pointless. But if the offer of proof
specifically alleges that material facts on which the rule was based
have changed since adoption of the rule, a hearing probably should be
required unless the agency can reasonably find that the alleged change
would make no difference. Such hearings could have the additional
advantage of requiring agencies to take a new look at their rules from
time to time when an interested person makes a colorable showing
that this is needed.
One commentator has convincingly suggested that courts have
generally been too reluctant to reverse agencies for perfunctory
denials of waiver requests9" and that this judicial attitude would
require substantial reform for waiver availability even to approach the
role which the Court envisioned for it in Storer:9 an opportunity for a
substitute "full hearing" which effectively reconciles a right to
hearing with agency authority to proceed by general rules. However, it
seems clear that even if the scope of review were thus expanded, waiver
availability could never solve the problem altogether since, at least in
require an evidentiary hearing, criticized the majority as making no distinction between the
merits and the right to a hearing, and suggested that the Commission has an obligation to
announce specific standards for the showing which must be made by the party seeking waiver.
Id. at 684. See also Community Serv., Inc. v. United States, supra.
98. See 54 IowA L. Rav., supra note 58, at 1103-04.
99. 351 U.S. 192, 202 (1956).
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the absence of changed circumstances, impeachment of the wisdom of
the rule in a waiver proceeding will generally not, and probably should
not, be permitted. The heart of the solution is to require effective
procedures,, up to and including a full-fledged evidentiary hearing
where appropriate, at the rule-making stage itself.
IV.
Section II of this discussion examined how, in appropriate cases,
rule making can and should be made more like adjudication. The
converse problem also exists: sometimes adjudication should be made
more like rule making. While an agency may well be justified in
preferring to formulate its policies on a case-by-case basis rather than
by rule making, safeguards may be necessary to ensure that non-
parties to the adjudication who may be significantly affected by the
new policy receive notice and have an opportunity to be heard. 10 Such
safeguards are desirable not only to protect individual rights but also
to give the agency the benefit of pertinent facts, arguments, and
considerations which might not be before it but which interested
persons could contribute. Nothing in the APA would prevent an
agency engaged in a formal adjudication from giving public notice
that the adjudication may result in the adoption of a new or
significantly altered principle or policy which would have application
beyond the parties to the proceeding. Neither would the Act prohibit
an agency from making available an appropriate means for interested
persons to participate. The notice should be given at that point in the
proceeding when it first becomes clear that the adoption of such a new
or significantly altered principle or policy becomes an issue or is
proposed by the agency as a basis for its decision.
The choice of a means for participation by interested persons
would be within the agency's sound discretion and would likely vary
considerably depending upon, among other circumstances, the stage
of the adjudication at which adoption of the new or significantly
altered principle first becomes a serious issue. If the issue emerges at
the pleadings stage or otherwise prior to the hearing, the hearing
examiner could give the public notice and allow other interested
persons to participate, either as parties for that limited purpose or on
an amicus basis, in the hearing itself.01 If the adoption of the new or
100. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969). See also note 51 supra.
101. The CAB's Rule 14(b), 14 C.F.R. § 302.14(b) (1970), while not directed specifically to
the situation here in question, provides a type of limited participation that might be a useful
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altered principle first emerges as a serious issue at the initial decision
stage, either the examiner or the agency could give the notice and
provide an appropriate means for participation. And if the issue first
emerges as the agency itself was considering its decision, it could
comply with the recommendation either by giving a notice of a
proposed or tentative decision or by issuing its final decision with an
adequate provision for filing of petitions for rehearing. In either case
the agency should provide that persons not theretofore parties to the
proceeding, on demonstrating that they would be affected by the new
principle, could participate as amicus or on some other limited,
appropriate basis. If such persons, in addition to presenting
arguments, made an offer of proof of material facts, the hearing in
some circumstances might have to be reopened-or the particular
adjudication might be allowed to proceed to a conclusion, if there
were urgent reasons therefor, and the evidence offered by the third
parties would be considered in a further adjudication or rule-making
proceeding.
The agency should of course balance the reasons favoring such a
procedure against any danger that the adjudication might be unduly
complicated or delayed. But the result of its balancing would be a
discretionary act which a reviewing court should scrutinize for
arbitrariness or abuse. If an agency does conclude an adjudication by
announcing a new principle of broad application without employing
any of the procedures suggested, the proper method for a surprised
and injured person to test the reasonableness of the agency's
procedure would be first to seek whatever reconsideration the
agency's rules permit and, that failing, to seek judicial review as "a
person suffering legal wrong because of agency action."102
NLRB v. A.P. W. Products Co. 10 3 suggests that what is here
proposed may be existing law. In that case the respondent contended
that a party to an adjudication was entitled to a warning that the
model here. Both the NLRB and the FPC have invited or accepted comments from non-parties
on changes of principle contemplated in pending adjudications. See Shapiro, supra note 48, at
931 (NLRB). In City of Chicago v. FPC, 385 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
945 (1968), the court held that the FPC was "free" to declare "a general principle in the context
of an individual proceeding, but with leave to the industry to participate amicus curiae," Id. at
643. The court indicated sympathy with "uneasiness [on the part of "courts and
commentators"] lest an excessively individuated approach may be a seed bed that is too
favorable to the rank weed of discrimination." Id. at 644.
102. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. V, 1970).
103. 316 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1963).
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Board was contemplating a change in its long-standing policy that a
back-pay obligation would be tolled for periods when intermediate
decisions favorable to the party were in effect. The court, relying in
part on the "spirit" of the predecessor of section 554(b)(3),104
declared:
It is not apparent why, in the ten months that the Examiner's report was
before it, the Board could not have found means to inform the parties-and
other interested persons-that overruling of its tolling rule was being
considered and to give them some opportunity to express their views. Although
even the highest tribunal has been known to overrule its own precedents, on
matters of some moment, though the issue had not been argued before it, we
might well remand to permit A.P.W. an opportunity to argue this issue to the
Board if any purpose would be served thereby. But it is manifest that this
would be an exercise in futility-the arguments A.P.W. would make on
remand have already been made by the dissenting members and rejected by the
majority. Although we thus do not altogether approve the procedure here, we
nevertheless grant enforcement.'
V.
The most constructive way to eliminate many of the inequities and
inadequacies which appear from time to time in administrative
proceedings is to pay less attention to theoretical, conceptual, and
largely artificial lines between adjudication and rule making, and to
devote more attention to the task of fashioning, out of the available
arsenal of procedural techniques, hybrid modes of procedure most
appropriate to the issues and circumstances of particular cases or
classes of cases. In general, when an agency decision must or should
turn on disputed issues of fact susceptible to the receipt of evidence,
those issues should be resolved in an evidentiary hearing even though
the proceeding is labeled a rule making and the facts are allegedly
"legislative." Conversely, when an agency is considering adoption of
a policy which could have a significant impact on unrepresented
parties, means should be found to give notice and invite participation
by non-parties even though the proceeding is labeled an
adjudication. 0
104. 5 U.S.C. § 554(b)(3) (Supp. V, 1970). The earlier provision stated that "p]ersons
entitled to notice of an agency hearing shall be timely informed of ... (3) the matters of fact
and law asserted."
105. 316 F.2d at 906 (emphasis added-footnotes omitted). See also City of Chicago v.
FPC, 385 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
106. Robinson reaches similar if not identical conclusions. See Robinson, supra note 48 at
536.
Vol. 1971:511
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
While the drafting and organization of the APA may encourage
reliance upon the conceptual or "labeling" approach by agencies,
parties and their counsel, commentators, and courts, it may not be
generally recognized quite how flexible the Act is in permitting parties
to request, and agencies to grant, exactly what has been suggested
here. There is, moreover, no statutory or doctrinal barrier to prevent
reviewing courts from requiring agencies, as a matter of sound
discretion, to grant requests for optional procedures when such
requests are properly supported and timely made.
Of the questions discussed, the courts have been explicit in
recognizing, at least theoretically, the right to a meaningful waiver
procedure. 17 Several opinions suggest that a reviewing court would be
receptive, in a proper case, to an argument that an agency abused its
discretion in a rule-making proceeding by, for example, refusing to
order an evidentiary hearing even though it were demonstrated that a
disputed issue of fact must be a crucial factor in its decision." 8 There
are also judicial hints that an agency could, where appropriate, be
required to import devices normally associated with rule
making-public notice and an opportunity for interested persons to
be heard-into a formal adjudication. 9 Such a practice might go far
toward solving the dilemma which so confusingly divided the
Supreme Court in the Wyman-Gordon case."0
Ideally, the law should be clarified by incorporating all the
suggestions here made in statutory amendments. While to some extent
the subject matter involves imponderables, it is not a matter of any
great difficulty to draft statutory provisions which take proper
account of these imponderables while furnishing opportunities for
private parties, guidelines for agencies, and standards for reviewing
courts. The following suggested new subsections of section 555 are
based on, but go beyond, the work of the Rulemaking Committee of
the Administrative Conference in 1969-70.111 They are set forth as
107. See notes 93-97 supra and accompanying text.
108. See section II supra. However, the tendency of some courts to hold that so-called
"legislative" facts are ipso facto unsuitable for evidentiary hearing is a retrograde trend. See
notes 81-92 supra and accompanying text.
109. See section IVsupra.
110. See note 51 supra.
111. As stated at note 42 supra, the resolution adopted by the Committee in March, 1970,
was not presented to the Conference and has undergone revision in the Committee. The revised
resolution was submitted to the Council of the Conference by the Committee on March 31,
1971.
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examples of ways in which the Act might be constructively amended
to accomplish these objectives. They are not, however, set forth with
any great optimism, given the "seeming legislative paralysis" 2 of
Congress in the administrative law area.
(f) Each agency shall provide, in proceedings to which Section 553 of this
title applies," 3 such procedures beyond those required by that section, including
oral argument or the taking of evidence or both on some or all issues, as may be
appropriate in the circumstances and would serve the ends of justice. When, in
any such agency proceeding, an interested person makes an offer of proof in
writing of facts which have a direct and substantial bearing on the issues
involved in the proceeding, the agency shall as part of its rule making hold a
hearing in accordance with Sections 556 and 557 of this title on such issue or
issues and shall permit oral argument thereon, unless it for good cause finds
(and incorporates in its decision the finding and a brief statement of reasons
therefor) that hearing or argument or both are impracticable, unnecessary or
contrary to the public interest."'
(g) When in any agency proceeding a party seeks relief,"' the agency shall,
before denying such relief on the ground that an existing rule so requires,
provide to such party an opportunity to show that application of the rule would
not be in the public interest. Such opportunity shall include provision for
written presentation and also, where appropriate, for oral argument or for a
hearing in accordance with Sections 556 and 557 of this title or both, depending
on the circumstances."
112. Friendly, supra note 6, at 1310.
113. That is, rule-making proceedings.
114. The first sentence of the text reproduces, almost verbatim, part of a recommendation
by the Committee which was not framed as a statutory amendment. The second sentence
contains the substance of a Committee recommendation for statutory amendment, except that
as proposed by the Committee the amendment was limited to cases in which the "interested
person makes a timely showing that the rule proposed in a notice of proposed rule making may
determine an issue or issues which might if the rule were not adopted subsequently arise in an
adjudication to which Section 556 applies." This language was designed to limit the
recommendation for statutory change to the class of cases discussed at notes 58-66 supra-those
in which a rule making may impair or preclude a statutory right to an adjudication. As
suggested, however, at notes 67-80 supra and accompanying text, the principle in question
appears to have legitimate application beyond that class of cases. The Committee's 1971
resolution eliminates the proposal for statutory amendment but recommends that in rule-
making proceedings agencies "should give consideration to whether oral argument or
evidentiary hearings or both would contribute to effective and fair resolution of the issues" and
observes that "circumstances warranting evidentiary hearings may exist, for example, where a
timely showing that the proposed rule would predetermine significant issues of fact in
subsequent formal adjudications is made and accompanied by a substantial offer of proof of
facts material to such issues."I 115. "Relief" is defined in 5 U.S.C. § 551 (11) (Supp. V, 1970). Since this subsection would
apply only when a party is seeking relief, not when he is resisting the imposition of a sanction,
defined in id. § 55 1(10), it would not permit a person to ignore a rule until enforcement is sought
and then to claim a right to show that the rule should not be applied to him.
116. The Committee's recommendation for statutory amendment in the waiver area was
limited to formal adjudications and did not contain the second sentence of the above text, the
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(h) When, in any agency proceeding to which Section 556 of this title
applies," 7 the adoption of a new or significantly altered or expanded rule of
law, policy, or statutory interpretation, which would have significant impact on
other persons in addition to the parties to the proceeding, becomes an issue or is
proposed by the agency as a basis for its decision, the agency shall unless
impracticable give public notice thereof and make available an appropriate
means for such persons to participate in the proceeding.
(j) Every agency which issues orders affecting substantial interests or
private persons, whether after hearing or through informal action without
hearing, shall, as far as is feasible in the circumstances, state through formal
decisions or general rules, or it that is impractical through policy statements
other than rules, the standards that guide its discretionary determination in
each type of agency action, and from time to time shall review its rules and
policy statements so that they will reflect the agency's developing experience
and understanding.
Statutory amendment along these lines is, no doubt, remote. But
each of the above texts could serve equally well as a headnote
statement of developing law which both agencies and courts may, and
should, apply.
substance of which, however, did appear as a hortatory recommendation. A statutory section in
the terms of the above text would seem more effective to overcome the undue judicial diffidence
in the waiver area. The Committee's 1971 resolution suggests that the problem be resolved
following the agency adjudication, by a "rulemaking proceeding to determine the extent to
which such decision should be applicable to persons other than the parties to the adjudication.
Alternatively, prior to making such a decision the agency might publish a tentative decision and
invite comment, inter alia, on the extent to which such decision should be applicable to persons
other than the parties. The agency should provide appropriate procedures (whether or not such
procedures are required by statute) whereby affected persons may participate in such subsequent
or enlarged proceedings."
117. That is, a formal adjudication.
[Vol. 1971:51
